| Ted Byfield on Sat, 26 Feb 2022 21:24:04 +0100 (CET) |
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| Re: <nettime> Almost zero |
I took the noise about Surkov with a grain of salt, because it was obvious even at the time that "he" was an orientalist trope — a Svengali-Rasputin figure, maybe with an added dash of vulgar Baudrillard. The fact that that *trope* — not the actual person but the figure — still exerts such magnetic attraction for Western minds says a lot. If Surkov was as innovative as his theorists claimed, that implies that earlier Russian history (and the Soviet history that came both before and after it) were, in comparison, a mix of stable, continuous, grounded, factual. Does that sound right? Not to my ear. If not, then maybe Surkov wasn't so innovative or so unique after all; maybe even the opposite. Here's a useful twitter thread that looks at the prehistory of Putin's strange claims about "denazifying" Ukraine: https://twitter.com/kamilkazani/status/1497306746330697738 One line I'd like to highlight: Putinism as "Russian Orthodox National-Communist Monarchism." Does that ring a few bells? It should. On the one hand, it's a template form understanding other incoherent reactionary movements like the GOP. But, more relevant here, I expect quite a few Nettimers have seen Michael Benson's excellent rocku-mocku-documentary _Predictions of Fire_, which — among many other things — traces how NSK / Irwin / Laibach mobilized wildly contradictory visual and rhetorical tropes — x>thirty years ago. If that's a substantive part of what Putin is doing now, then his alleged futurism turns out to be leftovers reheated one too many times. There's a low-res version of Michael's film on YouTube: https://youtu.be/j_WFz_1Imjc In particular, note the sequence in which NSK et al unfurl "Red Square on Black Square," in both a retrospective homage to Malevich and a futuristic provocation: https://vimeo.com/33345604 Brian wrote: > In the run-up to this war both the US and Britain tried something entirely > new for them, surely influenced by their knowledge of Surkov and associated > military doctrines. What did they do? Instead of strategically managing the > truth, they basically made their intelligence public as it came in. And the > intelligence was spot on. What a weird feeling: trustable intelligence. > Compare what happened before the Iraq War. It's nowhere near the same > circumstances, but still, positive. Who is this "they"? The US and UK? That's pretty vague. If you looked at the average age of staffers in the two countries' civilian / military / intel leadership offices, you'd see that the current "they" are, by definition, far too young to be the same "they" responsible for, say, either or the Gulf Wars. So OF COURSE "they" are doing things differently — they *are* different. So what are they doing now? Standard fare, imo. The rise of the net has brought about some pretty significant changes in how we ~read. For example, it's given rise to fluid experiments in forms, genre, structure, style; it's also led to vast numbers of people to read far more, and far more widely, than they used to. Both have contributed to a growing sensitivity to the *structures* of dialog. We've seen this very clearly in liberationist movements like #metoo and BLM, which have taught many more people to listen for ideology, in both substance and form. But this kind of thing everywhere — which helps to explain the meteoric rise of the word "trope," from an obscure-ish term of art to stock TikTok fare. Websites like TV Tropes, typologies of trolls and trolling (e.g., "sea-lioning," 'splaining, etc), and the all-consuming, ever-present tendency of young people to profile each other all point in different ways to what we could call the weaponization of genre itself. When you react to what someone says or does, they set the terms of debate; so, increasingly, people respond to *the form* of what someone says or does, in an effort to change and challenge those terms. I don't think we need Surkov to explain any of this. If anything, mentioning him just confuses things. Cheers, Ted On 26 Feb 2022, at 14:06, Brian Holmes wrote: > On Sat, Feb 26, 2022 at 10:00 AM May Jayyusi <mayjayyusi@gmail.com> wrote: > >> >> You mean to say that the USA is not a managed democracy? >> > > Well, those who have read me for longer may not agree about the lack of > critical distance from this quite terrifying society, the USA. But it's a > detail and doesn't matter. I share your outrage at all the things you > mention. > > I used to refer to Sheldon Wolin with his notion of managed democracy or > inverted totalitarianism, to describe the US formula of social control. > However that has broken down over the last decade, both usefullly (who > wants to be managed?) and dangerously (who wants to fall into chaos and be > taken over by a bunch of right-wing thugs?). Societies have become a lot > harder to manage over the last decade, for better and worse. So far the > fascist / authoritarian resurgence has been the big beneficiary. > > I forgot about the Adam Curtis film that refers to Surkov, because Curtis > lost me at that point. There is a point at which one can no longer just > wildly critique (although probably the location of that point varies, > depending on who you are). I borrowed the title Almost Zero for the post > because of the abysmal state, not only of US society but also the European > societies that offer us such a spectacle of deep corruption and complicity. > The whole situation is dangerous now. I think we all need to contribute to > making it better because it's getting a lot worse. 'Nuff said. > > Brian > > > On Sat, Feb 26, 2022 at 10:00 AM May Jayyusi <mayjayyusi@gmail.com> wrote: > >> >> You mean to say that the USA is not a managed democracy? What is the >> whole history of slavery and it’s current shameless voter suppression laws >> but “managing democracy”…. What were the brazen deceptions of the American >> performance pre both Wars against Iraq but that? The “Tonkin incident”? >> What is the role of the corporate media but that if “managing democracy”. >> What is amazing is your lack of critical distance from your own history Abd >> how that signifies if not for you but at least for the rest of us (non >> westerners). >> >> >> Sent from my iPhone >> >>> On 26 Feb 2022, at 10:15 AM, nettime-l-request@mail.kein.org wrote: >>> >>> Send nettime-l mailing list submissions to >>> nettime-l@mail.kein.org >>> >>> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit >>> http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l >>> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to >>> nettime-l-request@mail.kein.org >>> >>> You can reach the person managing the list at >>> nettime-l-owner@mail.kein.org >>> >>> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific >>> than "Re: Contents of nettime-l digest..." >>> >>> >>> Today's Topics: >>> >>> 1. Almost zero (Brian Holmes) >>> 2. Re: Almost zero (Keith Sanborn) >>> >>> >>> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- >>> >>> Message: 1 >>> Date: Sat, 26 Feb 2022 00:24:04 -0600 >>> From: Brian Holmes <bhcontinentaldrift@gmail.com> >>> To: nettime <nettime-l@kein.org> >>> Subject: <nettime> Almost zero >>> Message-ID: >>> <CANuiTgwB1q-CtG6PsFGh5djmjxX1J0eWXqqxfTyb=oLHO=gSHA@mail.gmail.com> >>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" >>> >>> Does anyone remember Vladislav Surkov, "managed democracy," "non-linear >>> war"? >>> >>> Sure, you must, he emerged into view in the West with the Ukraine war of >>> 2014, with the disinformation and the little green men. He was an >> aesthete >>> and "political technologist," a PR guy and a reality TV fan, able in his >>> position as Putin's chief counselor to conjure up an entire induced >>> political spectrum where multiple truths and decoy dissidence became >> tools >>> in a strategic calculus of "democratic" (or demotic, or demonic) power. >>> >>> Anyway, I sure remember him, because his transgressive postmodern >> cynicism >>> frankly struck fear in my heart, and if memory serves it was a weirdly >>> energizing affect for a whole lot of other people at the time. As Peter >>> Pomerantsev wrote in Politico way back in 2014: >>> >>> "If in the 20th century the Kremlin could only lobby through Soviet >>> sympathizers on the left, it now uses a contradictory kaleidoscope of >>> messages to build alliances with quite different groups. European >>> right-nationalists such as Hungary?s Jobbik or France?s Front National >> are >>> seduced by the anti-EU message; the far-left are brought in by tales of >>> fighting U.S. hegemony; U.S. religious conservatives are convinced by the >>> Kremlin?s stance against homosexuality. The result is an array of voices, >>> all working away at Western audiences from different angles, producing a >>> cumulative echo chamber of Kremlin support" (1). >>> >>> Does any of this sound familiar? Maybe to the tenth power? >>> >>> Some people say non-linear or hybrid warfare was a Russian response to US >>> information-war tactics in the era of the "color revolutions" (2). But >> then >>> the Russian twist became crude American reality in Trump's 2016 campaign. >>> It was the Saint Petersburg troll factories, it was Facebook and the new >>> media system, it was because Trump himself was a real-estate mogul, a >>> conduit for Russian capital flight and a reality TV guy at heart. >> Surkov's >>> name was never mentioned in the (pathetically faked) Steele Dossier, but >> as >>> the Democrats tried to save the day with their trials and their >>> Congressional morality plays, the post-truth pathology globalized. >>> >>> That was then, this is now. >>> >>> The amazing power of Surkovian social management was just on display: >>> Despite the advance of hundreds of thousands of troops with all requisite >>> equipment, most Ukrainians and Zelensky himself could not believe that >> war >>> would be unleashed. >>> >>> But the sudden obsolescence of the whole doctrine was also just on >> display: >>> Because here was Putin reverting to a pure imperial power discourse, >> blood, >>> soil and boots on the ground. Feint, contradiction and duplicity have >>> evaporated. Conventional interstate warfare is back. Is this why Surkov >> was >>> finally pulled from his post by Putin's order in 2020? Or??? >>> >>> In the run-up to this war both the US and Britain tried something >> entirely >>> new for them, surely influenced by their knowledge of Surkov and >> associated >>> military doctrines. What did they do? Instead of strategically managing >> the >>> truth, they basically made their intelligence public as it came in. And >> the >>> intelligence was spot on. What a weird feeling: trustable intelligence. >>> Compare what happened before the Iraq War. It's nowhere near the same >>> circumstances, but still, positive. >>> >>> Through its entanglement with anti-vaxx groups, but also because of the >>> political management of medical information during the pandemic, >> post-truth >>> has become a full-on social pathology. Putin has abandoned it because he >>> won that battle, he spread the disease for which authoritarianism and >> naked >>> power are the supposed cure. Information might be the oil of the 21st >>> century, but the truth, how to produce it and how to share it, how not to >>> fall prey to its myriad spurious avatars, that's the personal and >> political >>> question of our time. >>> >>> Truth is a culture, but an almost dead one. I think it could be the basis >>> of a new avant-garde. >>> >>> >>> Sources >>> >>> (1) >> https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/05/05/how-putin-is-reinventing-warfare/ >>> >>> (2) https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/195099/rp_121.pdf >>> -------------- next part -------------- >>> An HTML attachment was scrubbed... >>> URL: < >> http://mx.kein.org/pipermail/nettime-l/attachments/20220226/b35e1484/attachment-0001.html >>> >>> >>> ------------------------------ >>> >>> Message: 2 >>> Date: Sat, 26 Feb 2022 02:13:39 -0500 >>> From: Keith Sanborn <mrzero@panix.com> >>> To: bhcontinentaldrift@gmail.com >>> Cc: nettime <nettime-l@kein.org> >>> Subject: Re: <nettime> Almost zero >>> Message-ID: <67E9DC43-A036-41D7-8705-A2C4AE449D91@panix.com> >>> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" >>> >>> Making their intelligence public did nothing except possibly tip Putin >> off to its sources. >>> >>> It was, in the technical register, actionable. And yet there was no >> action: don?t provoke him by bringing in troops. Bringing in troops might >> have been the very thing to deter him from acting though he wd have >> ratcheted up his rants. He likely planned on acting in any case. Forewarned >> is not prepared. The publication of the intel had no effect because he had >> decided in advance to attack no matter what. It might have even forced his >> hand, if he cared what the world or what his subjects thought of him. >>> >>> So wd sending in troops or more sophisticated weapons have deterred him? >> Maybe not, but it wd have made his victory more costly. Making the victory >> Pyrrhic cd have hurt him at home worse than the moral shame: no one wants >> to see their children come home in body bags. But there are worse things. >> Living as a subaltern to Putin?s mafia is one of them. The Ukrainians know >> that. They have known that for a long time. It was Stalin who starved and >> murdered them and that?s where Putin gets his playbook. >>> >>> There are already courageous protests inside Russia. Putin threatened to >> arrest the protesters and still they showed up. And he made good on the >> threat. Body bags from the front might have given fuel to that fire. That >> is a truth no one can gainsay. And Russian media is keeping their human >> losses not or under-reported. But Russians are very sophisticated readers >> of ?news? and of the lack of it. >>> >>> Putin is a player of the long game. As is Xi. And yes, it is a matter of >> east and west. During the time I spent in Russia, I was shocked to hear >> this dichotomy, which I thought had been relegated to the dustbin of >> history, was alive and well?at a very deep level and not only by >> authoritarian politicians. The west is enslaved to quarterly thinking. >> That?s the current state of socio-economics, call it feudal or some >> advanced form of capitalism. The East is dominated by history. But as in >> China, history determines the present as it is rewritten. >>> >>> Cost for capitalists means outflow of economic resources. The Putin >> clique has so much well hidden wealth they can now only crave power and >> real estate. And they pay for it in other people?s blood. Putin tries to >> sell some bullshit neo-fascist mythology about Russian history. I don?t >> think it?s going to stick domestically. That is the only hope for the >> future. It means nothing to cut off an oligarch?s allowance. >>> >>>> On Feb 26, 2022, at 1:25 AM, Brian Holmes <bhcontinentaldrift@gmail.com> >> wrote: >>>> >>>> ? >>>> Does anyone remember Vladislav Surkov, "managed democracy," "non-linear >> war"? >>>> >>>> Sure, you must, he emerged into view in the West with the Ukraine war >> of 2014, with the disinformation and the little green men. He was an >> aesthete and "political technologist," a PR guy and a reality TV fan, able >> in his position as Putin's chief counselor to conjure up an entire induced >> political spectrum where multiple truths and decoy dissidence became tools >> in a strategic calculus of "democratic" (or demotic, or demonic) power. >>>> >>>> Anyway, I sure remember him, because his transgressive postmodern >> cynicism frankly struck fear in my heart, and if memory serves it was a >> weirdly energizing affect for a whole lot of other people at the time. As >> Peter Pomerantsev wrote in Politico way back in 2014: >>>> >>>> "If in the 20th century the Kremlin could only lobby through Soviet >> sympathizers on the left, it now uses a contradictory kaleidoscope of >> messages to build alliances with quite different groups. European >> right-nationalists such as Hungary?s Jobbik or France?s Front National are >> seduced by the anti-EU message; the far-left are brought in by tales of >> fighting U.S. hegemony; U.S. religious conservatives are convinced by the >> Kremlin?s stance against homosexuality. The result is an array of voices, >> all working away at Western audiences from different angles, producing a >> cumulative echo chamber of Kremlin support" (1). >>>> >>>> Does any of this sound familiar? Maybe to the tenth power? >>>> >>>> Some people say non-linear or hybrid warfare was a Russian response to >> US information-war tactics in the era of the "color revolutions" (2). But >> then the Russian twist became crude American reality in Trump's 2016 >> campaign. It was the Saint Petersburg troll factories, it was Facebook and >> the new media system, it was because Trump himself was a real-estate mogul, >> a conduit for Russian capital flight and a reality TV guy at heart. >> Surkov's name was never mentioned in the (pathetically faked) Steele >> Dossier, but as the Democrats tried to save the day with their trials and >> their Congressional morality plays, the post-truth pathology globalized. >>>> >>>> That was then, this is now. >>>> >>>> The amazing power of Surkovian social management was just on display: >> Despite the advance of hundreds of thousands of troops with all requisite >> equipment, most Ukrainians and Zelensky himself could not believe that war >> would be unleashed. >>>> >>>> But the sudden obsolescence of the whole doctrine was also just on >> display: Because here was Putin reverting to a pure imperial power >> discourse, blood, soil and boots on the ground. Feint, contradiction and >> duplicity have evaporated. Conventional interstate warfare is back. Is this >> why Surkov was finally pulled from his post by Putin's order in 2020? Or??? >>>> >>>> In the run-up to this war both the US and Britain tried something >> entirely new for them, surely influenced by their knowledge of Surkov and >> associated military doctrines. What did they do? Instead of strategically >> managing the truth, they basically made their intelligence public as it >> came in. And the intelligence was spot on. What a weird feeling: trustable >> intelligence. Compare what happened before the Iraq War. It's nowhere near >> the same circumstances, but still, positive. >>>> >>>> Through its entanglement with anti-vaxx groups, but also because of the >> political management of medical information during the pandemic, post-truth >> has become a full-on social pathology. Putin has abandoned it because he >> won that battle, he spread the disease for which authoritarianism and naked >> power are the supposed cure. Information might be the oil of the 21st >> century, but the truth, how to produce it and how to share it, how not to >> fall prey to its myriad spurious avatars, that's the personal and political >> question of our time. >>>> >>>> Truth is a culture, but an almost dead one. I think it could be the >> basis of a new avant-garde. >>>> >>>> >>>> Sources >>>> >>>> (1) >> https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/05/05/how-putin-is-reinventing-warfare/ >>>> >>>> (2) https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/195099/rp_121.pdf # distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nettime@kein.org # @nettime_bot tweets mail w/ sender unless #ANON is in Subject: